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The words "chemical and biological
weapons" (CBW) send a shiver down most
spines these days. With the end ofthe Cold
War, the possibility of a massive nuclear
confrontation appears remote, so today
many popular doomsday scenarios center on
the aggressive use of chemical or biological
warfare by rogue nations or terrorist groups.
As exaggerated as some ofthe accounts are,
with CBW cast as the latest unseen, unstop-
pable enemy, the threat posed by these
weapons is all too real, and growing.
Although most of the CBW agents
involve often complex technical challenges
to be met before they can be effectively
weaponized (used as weapons) and delivered
to a target, those challenges can be overcome
with the right combination ofexpertise and
resources. Even in crude form and delivered
in a crude fashion, CBW agents can have a
devastating impact. This sobering reality was
realized on 20 March 1995, when members
ofthe Aum Shinrikyo religious cult released
the nerve gas sarin in the Tokyo subway.
Twelve people were killed and more than
1,000 were hospitalized of the more than
5,000 who received medical attention. The
material was impure and the delivery
method was extremely crude, but with that
attack against civilians during peacetime,
and with the worldwide attention it received,
CBW agents graduated from being a con-
cern of the battlefield to a potential night-
mare ofour daily lives.
The likelihood of a CBW attack in some
form on American citizens or military per-
sonnel is increasing; many experts character-
ize it as a matter ofwhen, not if. In a 1997
press briefing (1) on the release of a report
on weapons of mass destruction, Defense
Secretary William Cohen said, "The threat is
neither far-fetched nor far off ... one that's
onlygoing to grow with time." Cohen noted
that terrorist organizations now possess the
capability ofusing such weapons. "The front
lines are no longer overseas. It can just as
well be in anyAmerican city," he said.
Fortunately, as the threat of a nuclear
Armageddon has waned, more attention has
been paid to how we can defend ourselves
against CBW agents in both military and
civilian settings. In 1998, the Department of
Defense (DoD) ordered that all U.S. mili-
tary personnel be vaccinated against anthrax,
which is considered to be the biological
agent most commonly weaponized and
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therefore the one most likely to be unleashed
on U.S. forces. The DoD is also funding
dozens of innovative research initiatives in
CBW detection, decontamination, and med-
ical treatment through its Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA). Among
these projects are a new protective helmet
designed to shield against harmful pathogens,
a "canary on a chip" bioweapon detector
made of living nerve cells embedded in sili-
con, and artificial antibodies capable ofbeing
quickly customized to fight offa specific bio-
logical agent.
DARPA funds the potentially revolu-
tionary projects. However, they represent
just the tip of the iceberg when it comes to
scientific inquiry in the CBW field. Many
other studies are in progress, which will add
significantly to the body ofknowledge about
these substances. The papers by Reutter,
Burrows and Renner, and Munro et al., each
in their own way, contribute new levels of
understanding of CBW agents and the
threat they represent to people and the envi-
ronment. Each paper adds important points
to the storehouse of data regarding CBW
agents and illuminates gaps in the data that
should be filled by further research.
Perhaps the most troubling issues are
raised by Sharon Reutter of the Toxicology
Team at the U.S. Army Edgewood Chemical
Biological Center at Aberdeen Proving
Ground, Maryland, in her article "Hazards of
ChemicalWeapons Release during War: New
Perspectives." Reutter's thesis is that today's
potential uses of chemical weapons have
changed dramatically since the compounds
were first developed, and that scientific analy-
sis of the materials and their toxicologic
effects must change to accommodate those
contemporary scenarios. According to
Reutter, "the way we look at the toxicity of
the chemical agents has changed. And people
don't realize that when they see some of the
reports that have come out lately. It's not that
anything has changed about the agents, but
we're asking different questions, and that
makes the answers different."
When the original research and develop-
ment work was conducted, says Reutter,
"people were designing weapons ofwar, and
they were trying to figure out how much
killed how quickly-or how little it would
take to kill how quickly, because you obvi-
ously want something the more potent the
better, within limits." Most of the research
was done on animals. A few studies, using
low doses to produce relatively mild effects,
were performed in humans-usually young,
healthy males, who were then the likely tar-
gets of a chemical attack. Although those
data are invaluable, they are inadequate to
answer the new questions arising from the
new perspectives Reutter describes. Today's
population for possible exposure to chemical
weapons is much broader. Even when only
considering the so-called chemical battlefield
comprising only military personnel, new
questions abound because ofthe presence of
many women in the armed forces. The lim-
ited data available appear to point to differ-
ences in the sensitivity ofwomen to chemi-
cal agents as compared to men. New targets
have brought about a need for newdata.
With chemical weapons currently in the
hands ofterrorists, those new targets include
everyone-the civilian population, with peo-
ple of all ages and states of health. Reutter
states flatly that "it should be assumed that a
civilian population would be more sensitive
than a military population"-perhaps as
much as a 10-fold difference.
Assessing the impact of CBW agents on
today's targets is further complicated by the
need for much more information about the
effects ofsublethal doses of chemical agents.
What long-term effects will these poisons
have on people who are exposed to low doses
over an extended period of time, which is a
likely exposure scenario today? The paucity of
dataaddressing thatquestion becomes dear in
Reutter's paper, as she compiles much ofthe
existing toxicologic information about each
specific agent. Also lacking is information
about the spectrum ofdosages, ranging from
very low doses that produce very mild effects
to doses that are just sublethal. As Reutter
states, "there are still many unknowns in the
linearity of the dose-response curves of the
agents over time." Answers to those and other
similar questions will be crucial when today's
hypothetical targets become tomorrow's
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actual victims. It is to be hoped that the scien-
tific community will respond quickly to this
particular wake-up call and endeavor to fill in
the data gap identified by these new perspec-
tives on killercompounds thathave been with
us forafairlylongtime.
Biological weapons are clearly a danger,
but thanks to "Biological Warfare Agents as
Threats to Potable Water," there is at least
one apocalyptic vision that can be taken off
the list ofCBW anxieties. The ultimate mes-
sage ofW. Dickinson Burrows and Sara E.
Renner ofthe U.S. Army Center for Health
Promotion and Preventive Medicine
(Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD) is that a
terrorist attempt to contaminate a large-scale
water supply in an American citywith a bio-
logical weapon is not only highly unlikely to
take place, but is highly unlikely to succeed
if it does. In both cases, of course, highly
unlikely is not the same as impossible. "It's
not, at least in a municipal consideration, a
cause for great alarm, but certainly a cause
for reasonable vigilance," says Burrows, an
environmental engineer specializing in
water. He notes that it is important for a
municipal waterworks to have a sound secu-
rity program, with fencing ofthe facility and
some provision for guarding it, but that such
security measures are realistically intended to
ward offvandals as much as terrorists.
The practical challenges to such an
attack would be formidable. Some ofthe 18
replicating agents and 9 biotoxins known or
suspected ofhaving been weaponized are not
waterborne threats. Others would be easily
inactivated or removed by the normal chlori-
nation and filtration processes in municipal
water supplies. Finally, Burrows and Renner
state,
With few exceptions the dose ofany BW [biolo-
bical warfare] agent required to cause adverse
health effects is ofsuch magnitude as to make
essential the targeting ofwater supplies closest to
the consumer....Targeting of large bodies of
water such as water supply reservoirs would be
impractical.
Ofmuch greater concern is the potential
ofmany ofthese agents to contaminate bat-
tlefield water supplies, whether they are
intentionally targeted or are tainted as a col-
lateral result of an aerosol BW attack. Even
so, a properly functioning field water treat-
ment system appears to provide a stout
defense against most of the BW agents. In
fact, the authors speculate that
the greatest risk of injury could be to those who
service the water treatment equipment and are
exposed to the agents at thehighest concentration.
Nonetheless, the threat exists and must be
taken seriously. Burrows and Renner call for
further development ofBWdetection equip-
ment, more testing of BW agents to deter-
mine their individual tolerances to chlorine
and other disinfection methods, and studies
of the efficacy of the various individual
point-of-use water purifiers in removing or
inactivating BW agents. Each of these
research initiatives would be important addi-
tions to the bodyofliterature addressing this
issue.
"The Sources, Fate, and Toxicity of
Chemical Warfare Agent Degradation
Products" by Munro et al. also contains, in
the midst of some extraordinarily detailed
and complicated chemistry, a gem ofgood
news for the general public. Now that the
United States (along with most of the other
countries in the world) has formally
renounced the use ofchemical weapons, the
sites where the agents were produced, tested,
and stored must be cleaned up and deconta-
minated; existing stockpiles, some decades
old, must be destroyed. Some of the stock-
piles have been buried, some have been
stored in less than ideal conditions, and some
have simply deteriorated with age. Leakage
and contamination of soil have occurred in
some instances. It is valid for the public to
ask whether any of these sites are environ-
mental disasters in the making. Could a
deadly nerve agent leach into groundwater
and contaminate drinkingwater?
Munro et al. provide ameasureofreassur-
ance that these stockpile sites do not consti-
tute amajor cause forenvironmental concern.
The authors provide an exhaustive review of
the literature regarding the chemical makeup
of the breakdown products of each of the
known chemical weapons, paying particular
attention to the toxicityand persistence in the
environment of those degradation products.
Fortunately, for the most part, the chemical
agents break down fairly rapidly when
exposed to the elements. According to coau-
thor Sylvia S. Talmage of the Life Sciences
Division at the Oak Ridge National
Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, "It was a
nice, pleasant surprise to see that these things
are mostly not persistent, but they will break
down naturally, and most ofthe breakdown
products are less toxic, and some practically
innocuous." Also, says Talmage, "There are
many people, many researchers, working on
ways to take what is there at these sites,
whether the drums are intact or not, and
denature them, decontaminate, break down
the product, speeding up the process that can
be used to break down the chemicals....
Theseproblems are beingsolved."
Those researchers, and the personnel
responsible for the on-site work ofdeanup
and decontamination, will no doubt find the
paper by Munro et al. to be an invaluable
resource in the course oftheir pursuits. It is a
thorough compendium of the existing data
on these sometimes obscure chemicals, and
the authors have performed an important
service by gathering so much of this infor-
mation in one place.
Despite the best efforts ofcivilized people
around the world, chemical and biological
weapons and the many-faceted threat they
represent are here to stay. As with nuclear
weapons, the genie can't be stuffed back in
the bottle. However, the work of these
researchers, and countless others like them,
does lend some comfort. The scientific com-
munity is responding to the CBW challenge,
providing innovative and vital new answers
to the newquestions beingposed.
Ernie Hood
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